Deconstructing Bin Laden
Victor Davis Hanson has a very interesting article that I encourage you to read. I have supplied the link and a couple of paragraphs. It is called:
“We don’t know whether the latest and much-discussed Osama bin Laden tape was recorded recently. But the harangue is still a valuable reflection of the current al Qaeda hierarchy that broadcast it to the world.
First, things must be going very badly for the terrorists to propose a ceasefire: “We don’t mind offering you a long-term truce.”
In truth, the winning side does not ask for a reprieve. Losing autocrats â€” whether the officers of the German army in the summer of 1918 or Hitler’s cadre in the spring of 1945 â€” always “don’t mind” sending out peace feelers in the 11th hour to salvage their power before they lose it for good.
That is not to say there won’t be more sacrifices to come. The battles of the Bulge and Okinawa were the most costly for Americans of World War II, and ended just months before the Nazi and Japanese capitulations.
But examine al Qaeda’s plight. Bin Laden’s home base in Afghanistan is lost for good. Elites of his terrorist organization are targeted from the air even in the supposedly safe Pakistani borderlands. Plenty of al Qaeda terrorists have been killed in Iraq. Europe is suddenly galvanizing against Islamic fascism. (France even mentions the unmentionable of targeting terrorist patrons with nuclear weapons.) India has no tolerance for Islamic extremism. The terrorist sponsors of Iran and Syria are finally becoming international pariahs. And thousands of Muslims have demonstrated in Lebanon and Jordan against terrorist bombers.
Because bin Laden has failed to repeat 9/11, he oddly feels he must explain to his American targets why he has been unable to kill them. In a “Wizard of Oz” pay-no attention-to-that-man-behind-the-curtain moment, he offers us this: “The delay in similar operations happening in America has not been because of failure to break through your security measures.”
Second, al Qaeda’s talking points seem to derive from American anti-war rhetoric, as bin Laden and Co. desperately cling to the notion that our resolve may yet crumble. Whether domestic critiques of the Bush administration’s anti-terror policies are heartfelt or gratuitous, accurate or fabricated, an encouraged bin Laden doesn’t care: He simply regurgitates these arguments as his own to throw back against us. Either bin Laden can’t come up with any more grievances himself, or he figures that Americans are better at making his case for him.”